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Abstract 
Natural science, properly understood, provides us with the methodological key to the 
salvation of humanity. First, we need to acknowledge that the actual aims of science are 
profoundly problematic, in that they make problematic assumptions about metaphysics, 
values and the social use of science.  Then we need to represent these aims in the form of a 
hierarchy of aims, which become increasingly unproblematic as one goes up the hierarchy; as 
result we create a framework of relatively unproblematic aims and methods, high up in the 
hierarchy, within which much more problematic aims and methods, low down in the 
hierarchy, may be improved as scientific knowledge improves. Then, we need to generalize 
this hierarchical, aims-and-methods-improving methodology so that it becomes fruitfully 
applicable to any worthwhile endeavour with problematic aims. Finally, we need to apply this 
methodology to the immensely problematic task of making progress towards as good a world 
as feasible. 
 
Here is an idea that just might save the world.  It is that science, properly understood, 
provides us with the methodological key to the salvation of humanity. 
A version of this idea can be found buried in the works of Karl Popper.  Famously, Popper 
argued that science cannot verify theories, but can only refute them.  This sounds very 
negative, but actually it is not, for science succeeds in making such astonishing progress by 
subjecting its theories to sustained, ferocious attempted falsification.  Every time a scientific 
theory is refuted by experiment or observation, scientists are forced to try to think up 
something better, and it is this, according to Popper, which drives science forward.   
Popper went on to generalize this falsificationist conception of scientific method to form a 
notion of rationality, critical rationalism, applicable to all aspects of human life.  
Falsification becomes the more general idea of criticism.  Just as scientists make progress by 
subjecting their theories to sustained attempted empirical falsification, so too all of us, 
whatever we may be doing, can best hope to achieve progress by subjecting relevant ideas to 
sustained, severe criticism.  By subjecting our attempts at solving our problems to criticism, 
we give ourselves the best hope of discovering (when relevant) that our attempted solutions 
are inadequate or fail, and we are thus compelled to try to think up something better.  By 
means of judicious use of criticism, in personal, social and political life, we may be able to 
achieve, in life, progressive success somewhat like the progressive success achieved by 
science.  We can, in this way, in short, learn from scientific progress how to make personal 
and social progress in life.  Science, as I have said, provides the methodological key to our 
salvation. 
I discovered Karl Popper’s work when I was a graduate student doing philosophy at 
Manchester University, in the early 1960s.  As an undergraduate, I was appalled at the 
triviality, the sterility, of so-called “Oxford philosophy”.  This turned its back on all the 
immense and agonizing problems of the real world – the mysteries and grandeur of the 
universe, the wonder of our life on earth, the dreadful toll of human suffering – and instead 
busied itself with the trite activity of analysing the meaning of words.  Then I discovered 
Popper, and breathed a sigh of relief.  Here was a philosopher who, with exemplary 
intellectual integrity and passion, concerned himself with the profound problems of human 
existence, and had extraordinarily original and fruitful things to say about them.  The 
problems that had tormented me had in essence, I felt, already been solved. 
But then it dawned on me that Popper had failed to solve his fundamental problem – the 
problem of understanding how science makes progress.  In one respect, Popper’s conception 
of science is highly unorthodox: all scientific knowledge is conjectural; theories are falsified 
but cannot be verified.  But in other respects, Popper’s conception of science is highly 
orthodox.  For Popper, as for most scientists and philosophers, the basic aim of science is 
knowledge of truth, the basic method being to assess theories with respect to evidence, 
nothing being accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence.  This 
orthodox view – which I came to call standard empiricism – is, I realised, false.  Physicists 
only ever accept theories that are unified – theories that depict the same laws applying to the 
range of phenomena to which the theory applies.  Endlessly many empirically more 
successful disunified rivals can always be concocted, but these are always ignored.  This 
means, I realised, that science does make a big, permanent, and highly problematic 
assumption about the nature of the universe independently of empirical considerations and 
even, in a sense, in violation of empirical considerations – namely, that the universe is such 
that all grossly disunified theories are false.  Without some such presupposition as this, the 
whole empirical method of science breaks down. 
It occurred to me that Popper, along with most scientists and philosophers, had 
misidentified the basic aim of science.  This is not truth per se.  It is rather truth presupposed 
to be unified, presupposed to be explanatory or comprehensible (unified theories being 
explanatory).  Inherent in the aim of science there is the metaphysical – that is, untestable – 
assumption that there is some kind of underlying unity in nature.  The universe is, in some 
way, physically comprehensible. 
But this assumption is profoundly problematic.  We do not know that the universe is 
comprehensible.  This is a conjecture.  Even if it is comprehensible, almost certainly it is not 
comprehensible in the way science presupposes it is today.  For good Popperian reasons, this 
metaphysical assumption must be made explicit within science and subjected to sustained 
criticism, as an integral part of science, in an attempt to improve it. 
The outcome is a new conception of science, and a new kind of science, which I called 
aim-oriented empiricism.  This subjects the aims, and associated methods, of science to 
sustained critical scrutiny, the aims and methods of science evolving with evolving 
knowledge.  Philosophy of science (the study of the aims and methods of science) becomes 
an integral, vital part of science itself.  And science becomes much more like natural 
philosophy in the time of Newton, a synthesis of science, methodology, epistemology, 
metaphysics and philosophy.   
The aim of seeking explanatory truth is however a special case of a more general aim, that 
of seeking valuable truth.  And this is sought in order that it be used by people to enrich their 
lives.  In other words, in addition to metaphysical assumptions inherent in the aims of science 
there are value assumptions, and political assumptions, assumptions about how science 
should be used in life.  These are, if anything, even more problematic than metaphysical 
assumptions.  Here, too, assumptions need to be made explicit and critically assessed, as an 
integral part of science, in an attempt to improve them. 
Released from the crippling constraints of standard empiricism, science would burst out 
into a wonderful new life, realising its full potential, responding fully both to our sense of 
wonder and to human suffering, becoming both more rigorous and of greater human value.    
And then, in a flash of inspiration, I had my great idea.  I could tread a path parallel to 
Popper’s.  Just as Popper had generalized falsificationism to form critical rationalism, so I 
could generalise my aim-oriented empiricist conception of scientific method to form an aim-
oriented conception of rationality, potentially fruitfully applicable to all that we do, to all 
spheres of human life.  But the great difference would be this.  I would be starting out from a 
conception of science – of scientific method – that enormously improves on Popper’s notion.  
In generalizing this, to form a general idea of progress-achieving rationality, I would be 
creating an idea of immense power and fruitfulness. 
I knew already that the line of argument developed by Popper, from falsificationism to 
critical rationalism, was of profound importance for our whole culture and social order, and 
had far-reaching implications and application for science, art and art criticism, literature, 
music, academic inquiry quite generally, politics, law, morality, economics, psychoanalytic 
theory, evolution, education, history – for almost all aspects of human life and culture.  The 
analogous line of argument I was developing, from aim-oriented empiricism to aim-oriented 
rationalism, would have even more fruitful implications and applications for all these fields, 
starting as it did from a much improved initial conception of the progress-achieving methods 
of science. 
The key point is extremely simple.  It is not just in science that aims are profoundly 
problematic.  This is true in life as well.  Above all, it is true of the aim of creating a good 
world – an aim inherently problematic for all sorts of more or less obvious reasons.  It is not 
just in science that problematic aims are misconstrued or “repressed”; this happens all too 
often in life too, both at the level of individuals, and at the institutional or social level as well.  
We urgently need to build into our scientific institutions and activities the aims-and-methods-
improving methods of aim-oriented empiricism, so that scientific aims and methods improve 
as our scientific knowledge and understanding improve.  Likewise, and even more urgently, 
we need to build into all our other institutions, into the fabric of our personal and social lives, 
the aims-and-methods-improving methods of aim-oriented rationality, so that we may 
improve our personal, social and global aims and methods as we live. 
One outcome of the 20th century is a widespread and deep-seated cynicism concerning the 
capacity of humanity to make real progress towards a genuinely civilized, good world.  
Utopian ideals and programmes, whether of the far left or right, that have promised heaven 
on earth, have led to horrors.  Stalin’s and Hitler’s grandiose plans led to the murder of 
millions.  Even saner, more modest, more humane and rational political programmes, based 
on democratic socialism, liberalism, or free markets and capitalism, seem to have failed us.  
Thanks largely to modern science and technology, many of us today enjoy far richer, 
healthier and longer lives than our grandparents or great grandparents, or those who came 
before.  Nevertheless the modern world is confronted by grave global problems: the lethal 
character of modern war, the spread and threat of armaments, conventional, chemical, 
biological and nuclear, rapid population growth, severe poverty of millions in Africa, Asia 
and elsewhere, destruction of tropical rain forests and other natural habitats, rapid extinction 
of species, annihilation of languages and cultures.  And over everything hangs the menace of 
climate change, threatening to intensify all the other problems (apart, perhaps, from 
population growth).   
All these grave global problems are the almost inevitable outcome of the successful 
exploitation of science and technology plus the failure to build aim-oriented rationality into 
the fabric of our personal, social and institutional lives.  Modern science and technology 
make modern industry and agriculture possible, which in turn make possible population 
growth, modern armaments and war, destruction of natural habitats and extinction of species, 
and global warming.  Modern science and technology, in other words, make it possible for us 
to achieve the goals of more people, more industry and agriculture, more wealth, longer lives, 
more development, housing and roads, more travel, more cars and aeroplanes, more energy 
production and use, more and more lethal armaments (for defence only of course!).  These 
things seem inherently desirable and, in many ways, are highly desirable.  But our successes 
in achieving these ends also bring about global warming, war, vast inequalities across the 
globe, destruction of habitats and extinction of species.  All our current global problems are 
the almost inevitable outcome of our long-term failure to put aim-oriented rationality into 
practice in life, so that we actively seek to discover problems associated with our long-term 
aims, actively explore ways in which problematic aims can be modified in less problematic 
directions, and at the same time develop the social, the political, economic and industrial 
muscle able to change what we do, how we live, so that our aims become less problematic, 
less destructive in both the short and long term.  We have failed even to appreciate the 
fundamental need to improve aims and methods as the decades go by.  Conventional ideas 
about rationality are all about means, not about ends, and are not designed to help us improve 
our ends as we proceed. Implementing aim-oriented rationality is essential if we are to 
survive in the long term.  To repeat, the idea spelled out in this book, if taken seriously, just 
might save the world.   
Einstein put his finger on what is wrong when he said "Perfection of means and confusion 
of goals seems, to my opinion, to characterize our age."   This outcome is inevitable if we 
restrict rationality to means, and fail to demand that rationality – the authentic article – must 
quite essentially include the sustained critical scrutiny of ends. 
Scientists, and academics more generally, have a heavy burden of responsibility for 
allowing our present impending state of crisis to develop.  Putting aim-oriented rationality 
into practice in life can be painful, difficult and counter-intuitive.  It involves calling into 
question some of our most cherished aspirations and ideals.  We have to learn how to live in 
aim-oriented rationalistic ways.  And here, academic inquiry ought to have taken a lead.  The 
primary task of our schools and universities, indeed, ought to have been, over the decades, to 
help us learn how to improve aims and methods as we live.  Not only has academia failed 
miserably to take up this task, or even see it as necessary or desirable.  Even worse, perhaps, 
academia has failed itself to put aim-oriented rationality into practice.  Science has met with 
such astonishing success because it has put something like aim-oriented empiricism into 
scientific practice – but this has been obscured and obstructed by the conviction of scientists 
that science ought to proceed in accordance with standard empiricism – with its fixed aim and 
fixed methods.  Science has achieved success despite, and not because of, general allegiance 
of scientists to standard empiricism. 
The pursuit of scientific knowledge dissociated from a more fundamental concern to help 
humanity improve aims and methods in life is, as we have seen, a recipe for disaster.  This is 
the crisis behind all the others.  We are in deep trouble.  We can no longer afford to blunder 
blindly on our way.  We must strive to peer into the future and steer a course less doomed to 
disaster.  Humanity must learn to take intelligent and humane responsibility for the unfolding 
of history. 
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